Varieties of System Transformations and Their Structural Background Based on the IPS Model by Maria Csanadi
 
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
BUDAPEST, 2011 
 





Varieties of System Transformations 
and Their Structural Background 







MT-DP – 2011/5 
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments. 
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Varieties of System Transformations and Their Structural Background  















ISSN 1785 377X  
Varieties of System Transformations and Their 





This study is the theoretical chapter of a planned book. This book, aims to contribute to the 
theoretical foundations of similarities and differences in the transformation of party-state 
systems. Analytical framework of system transformation is based on the extension of the 
Interactive Party State model (Csanádi, 2006) where specifics of the structure and 
operation of party-state systems and structural background of their disparities were 
described and analyzed. Self-similarities and disparities of transformation and path-
dependency of the variety of systemic outcomes are assigned to structural characteristics 
of power distribution of party-state systems interpreted as networks. The empirical part of 
the book uses the Chinese case to test this theory, measuring the dynamics of system 
transformation, the consequences of short- and long-term external adaptation pressures 
on the system transformation and long-term consequences of the short-term reactions to 
these pressures and their spatial disparities. This research was supported by the National 
Research Foundation in Hungary. 
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Rendszerátalakulások változatai és ezek szerkezeti 








E tanulmány egy tervezett könyv elméleti fejezetét tartalmazza. A könyv a pártállamok 
átalakulásának hasonlóságainak és eltéréseinek elméleti alapjait kívánja lefektetni.     
Az átalakulás továbbfejleszthető analitikai keretét az interaktív pártállami  (IPS) modell  
adja (Csanádi 2006), amely korábban a pártállami rendszerek szerkezeti és működési 
sajátosságait, valamint azok eltéréseinek szerkezeti hátterét elemezte. Az átalakulás mögött 
sejthető hasonlóságokat és eltéréseket, valamint a kialakuló rendszerek változatossága 
mögött rejlő kényszerpályákat a modell a hatalomeloszlás szerkezeti sajátosságainak 
tulajdonítja. Kína példája alapján empirikusan is teszteli az elméletet, méri a 
rendszerátalakulás dinamikáját, a rövid és hosszútávú külső adaptációs nyomások 
következményeit, valamint a belső reakciókat és ezek térbeli eltéréseit.  
 
Tárgyszavak:  rendszerátalakulás, gazdasági átalakulás, politikai átalakulás, az 
átalakulás sorrendje, az átalakulás eltérései, a kialakuló rendszerek változatai, pártállami 
háló 
 




A kutatás az OTKA támogatásával készült. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Transformation of party-state systems has been a hot topic for more than a decade in 
comparative literature (e.g. Kornai, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996a,b, 2000a.b; Aslund, 
1993; Qian and Xu, 1993; Gelb, et al.  1994; Wu, 1994; Walder, 1995; Denglian, at al., 1997; 
Gelb, at al.1994; Gomulka, 1994; Wu, 1994; Walder, 1995, Csanádi, 1995 Sachs and Woo, 
1997; Qian, 1998; Tong, 1997; Woo, 1998; Hellman, 1998; World Bank, 1998; Carothers, 
2002).  Despite the permanent economic and political problems these transformations 
caused and the large range of systems they developed into, the scientific interest on the 
topic faded away, giving way to the actual problem of varieties of post-soviet capitalisms 
(e.g. Bunce, Roeder, 1994; 1995, 1999, 2000; David, 2000; Bandelj, 2003; Gans-Morse, 
2004; Knell, Mark and Martin Srholec, 2005; Buchen, 2005; Coates, 2005; Kornai, 2003, 
2006, 2008a,b; Havrylyshyn, 2006; Lane 2007; Hanson, 2007; Mizobata, 2008; Frane et 
al, 2009; Ray, 2009; Degenkolb, 2010) and later to global crisis.1 It is not unusual that 
topics suddenly emerge and sink into oblivion without theoretically solving substantial 
issues as new dramatic events arrive. The purpose of this chapter is to connect operation 
and transformation of party-states and varieties of the new-born systems. This chapter 
offers a new comparative framework, that of the Interactive Party-state model to analyze 
the transformation, path-dependencies and varieties in the systemic outcomes of 
transformation of party-states. We introduce the concept of system transformation based 
on the model. This concept implies the retreat of the party-state network as a social system 
and the emergence of a new system outside of it, both nested in global dynamics. We also 
reveal the strong interaction of external and internal constraints – inducing, accelerating, 
or slowing down, the process of transformation. We point to the possible factors that 
structurally influence the characteristics of transformation and define path-dependency of 
possible system outcomes. Finally we make some initial efforts to interpret self-
reproduction, changes, transformation and outcomes as a social system evolution. 
 
                                                        
1 Both the literature of transitology and that of the varieties of capitalism from the point of view of 
system transformation will be analyzed in the first chapter pre-empting and introducing the 
theoretical analysis.  
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SYSTEM 
TRANSFORMATION  
 
We have implemented a comparative analytical model that describes the structure, 
operation and transformation of party-state systems. This model is called Interactive 
Party-state model (IPS) (Csanádi, 1997, 2006). The model is based on the dependency and 
interest promotion possibilities among party- state- and economic decision-makers during 
the decision-making process. The model incorporates the interactive network these 
relationships form, the main elements, main connecting principles and main operating 
principles of this network. It describes the selection system in the distribution of resources 
based on the political rationality of the structure and operation of the network. It analyzes 
the adapting behavior and interest of decision-makers that leads to the cohesion and self-
reproduction of the network. It also deals with the main endogenous structural and 
behavioral traps embodied by the political rationality of economic behavior during self-
reproduction of the network that incites system transformation. The model describes the 
above structural and operational characteristics as self-similar traits in space, time and 
aggregation levels. It also describes the structural background of the disparities in self-
reproduction and transformation, based on the different distributions of power within the 
network despite self-similarities. These different distributions of power will have an 
impact on the different pace, sequence and conditions of system transformation and 
consequently, on the varieties of the emerging new system.   
Next, we shall deal with the transformation from the approach of the IPS model by 
clarifying the basic concepts of the model and its functions. These concepts will gradually 
drive the reader to the analytical description of system transformation and its disparities 
in time, space and different level aggregations of the network. We shall also draw attention 
to some aspects of social system evolution from the approach of self-reproduction, change, 
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Operation:  
the process of self-reproduction of the system  
Self-reproduction:  
Self-reproduction is the process of resource extraction, resource attraction and 
resource allocation (distribution) in the system in the given distribution of power.  
Distribution of power:  
Distribution of power is the distribution of the bargaining capacities (resource 
extracting, resource attracting and allocating capacities and resisting capacity of actors to 
intervention) within the party-state power network.  
Party-state power network:  
The network is formed by the dependency and interest promotion relationships 
between party, state and economic decision-makers during the decision-making process. 
Relationship is institutionalized through the power instruments of the party that interlink 
individual non-party and party decision-makers. The model defines three overlapping and 
intertwined layers of relationship among decision-makers that form the party-state 
structure:  
(1) The first layer is the party hierarchy monopolizing the political sub-sphere and the 
state hierarchy with the state-monopolized economy that allows for the monopolized 
extraction and distribution of resources (see Fig. 1)  
Figure 1. 
  First layer: the formal hierarchies int he party-state structure 
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(2) The second layer shows that the two separate hierarchies are interlinked by the 
party’s instruments of power that infiltrate the boundaries of non-party institutions and 
overlap the decision-making process through positional structure, activity structure, 
organizational structure and individual decision-makers through their party discipline. 
These interlinking dependency lines at the same time allow for the interest promotion of 
those embraced by them, introducing an inequality of interest promotion among decision-
makers attached to and deprived of these lines (see Fig. 2). 
Figure 2. 
 Second layer: the interlinking threads 
 
 
(3) The third layer is formed by the institutionalized practice that decision-making 
process for some, strategically more important, actors may be short-cut both within each 
hierarchy and also across state-to- party hierarchy. Shortcut is created when actors at 
lower levels of the hierarchy participate in higher level decision-making bodies, or are 
monitored selectively by higher levels. Through short-cuts new inequality of interest 
promotion is introduced: those privileged by them may meet decision-makers of higher 
levels whom otherwise would never meet in their formal position, influence decisions, 
accumulate new short-cuts and prepare to unavoidable impacts (see Fig. 3).  
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Figure 3. 
 The third layer: the short-cuts in the decision-making process 
 
Principles of operation: 
The three intertwined layers will form the party-state network. The structure reveals its 
principles of connection: a) dependency lines interlinking the party and non-party 
structures may only origin from party hierarchy, since they are the instruments of its 
power. b) Cross-hierarchy short-cuts may only origin from non-party hierarchies, since 
shortcuts form feedback loops through interlining dependency lines originating from the 
party.  
We may also define the principles of operation based on the specifics of the structure: 
since all actors hold hierarchical dependency lines but only actors in the party hierarchy 
hold dependency lines interlinking individual decision-makers in all other sub-spheres, 
dependencies, interest promotion and resource extraction and allocation are directly or 
indirectly politically monopolized. 
Consequently, the party, originally as one entity in one sub-sphere (political) through 
its power instruments permeating and monopolizing non-party subfields and defining its 
internal inequalities develops into a politically monopolized power network. Figure 4 
depicts the characteristics of this network.  
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Figure 4. 
Structural characteristics of the party-state network 
 
 
Note: S= state hierarchy, P= party hierarchy, An= Actor at level n, D1= 
direction of intra-hierarchy dependence, D2= direction of cross-hierarchy 
dependence, I1 direction of intra-hierarchy interest promotion I2= direction 
of cross hierarchy interest promotion, I3 short-cuts  forming feedbacks 
within and across hierarchies. 
 
Structural motivations of behavior: 
Actors in this structure are in dual position: they are simultaneously holders of and 
captured by dependency lines. As monopolistic holders of the lines, they are able and 
simultaneously forced to intervene – otherwise losing bargaining position.  As embraced 
by dependency lines they are exposed and simultaneously interested in keeping and 
multiplying dependency threads for greater chances for maneuver in interest promotion 
and accommodate to expectations– otherwise losing bargaining position. Bargaining 
capacities and positions are difficult to measure or even judge. The sheer size and lack of 
transparency of the structure strengthens even further the structural atomization of those 
actors already tied individually to the interlinking threads: unknown and indiscernible forces 
lie behind and face each actor. This changeable and indeterminate power will be called the 
phantom force (Csanádi, 1997).  Because of the existence of the closed channels and the 
phantom force, decision-makers are unable with any certainty to judge either their own 
strength or that of their allies or, indeed, the real power of their opponents.  Because of the 
phantom force, therefore, the bargaining positions and bargaining capacities of each actor in 
relation to all the others are always uncertain.  Despite the dependence and the unequal 
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capacities for interest promotion within the whole system, this uncertainty demands of every 
single decision-maker constant vigilance, activity, and adaptability.  Even if this position 
proves relatively stable, each actor has to struggle constantly to keep it so. Therefore, they are 
compelled to take good care of existing connections and strive to create new ones.  
The content of the phantom force in any given decision-making situation depends on a 
number of things: the individual decision-maker's feedback loops that are active at any 
given moment; the current number of allies, the density and quality of their feedback 
connections and the level of their accumulation; and, finally the mystified nature of the 
structures themselves.  The phantom force of an actor or an institution behind the actor is 
always as large as its environment is willing - or is forced - to believe. 
Capacity and force t intervene, exposure and interest together interacting with 
phantom-force ensure the politically rational motivations of economic behavior for self-
reproduction of the bargaining position of an actor and thereby the cohesion and 
reproduction of the whole network. Economic rationality of actors is steered by the 
political rationality of their behavior. 
Constraints of self-reproduction of actors and those of the structure as a whole: 
Actor’s dual position implies dual function in one entity: as holder of the dependency 
lines he is an intervener; and as embraced by those he is a pleader influencing his capacity 
of self-reproduction. One single actor as holder (intervener) of the lines has resource 
extracting and redistributing capacity and as embraced by those (pleader), has resource 
attracting and resisting capacities to interventions.  
These factors together will provide the structural constraints of the capacity for self-
reproduction of an actor. Constraints however are not uniform: they depend on the actors’ 
bargaining capacity within the network resulting from accumulated interlinking lines and 
shortcuts reinforced or weakened by phantom force. Thus, constraints of self-reproduction 
may be selectively hard or soft. Selectively soft constraints in bargaining capacities and 
politically rational concerns of distribution will define both the actors’ level of fitness for 
selection during self-reproduction and the direction of fixed paths of resource and other 
privilege distribution within the network.  
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The structure and its traps in self-reproduction: 
In this network both structural and functional characteristics are based on politically 
rational concerns. Structurally, political concerns determine the rationale of connecting 
other than political subfields using power instruments for connection; politically rational 
are the concerns of in-built inequalities of dependency and interest promotion and the 
principles of connection and operation providing a politically monopolized power network. 
Based on the politically rational construction of the structure and the principles of 
operation, also factors of self-reproduction will be based on political rationality. Such are: 
the nature of dependencies, interest promotion and resource extraction and distribution, 
the bargaining capacities, the phantom-force, the criteria of selection in allocation, 
selectively soft/hard reproduction constraints of self-reproduction, the  fixed paths of 
resource distribution and the hardening reproduction constraints of the whole network.  
Structural and operational characteristics will conclude in the political rationality of 
economic motivations and behavior (accumulating feedbacks and drive for growth, 
adapting behavior to politically rational expectations to keep or improve bargaining 
capacity, etc). Consequently, both constraints of and motivations for efficiency in self-
reproduction will be lacking individually and for the whole structure. Politically rational 
fixed paths of distribution and selective softness (based on increased bargaining capacities 
in resource attraction and resisting extraction) and accommodating politically rational 
economic behavior of actors from time to time will lead to the structural shortage of 
resources to extract and distribute. Shortage will induce hardening structural constraints 
of self-reproduction of the whole network result in the loss of cohesion of the structure. 
Concluding the above, politically rational concerns and economic behavior form traps 
in the process of self-reproduction since structural rather than economic constraints – that 
is, the given distribution of power -- determine the hardness or softness of reproduction, 
both for individuals, units and the network as a whole. Thus, the process of self-
reproduction is prone to self-consumption. Internal structural constraints are not 
insulated from external constraints but strongly interact with those influencing self-
reproduction. 
External constrains:  
Definition of “external” in our approach means both the domestic sphere outside the 
network and international conditions reduced by other countries that actually form the 
higher aggregation levels of the given level unit. In the case of the east European party-
states Moscow was a supra-unit of their network, tied by multiple institutionalized 
political, military and economic threads of different strength and density at different 
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periods and countries. Moscow formed their self-similar higher level aggregation. Similar 
institutionalized power relations were existent, though much weaker, scarcer and 
constrained in the Stalinist and Hrushchev period between Moscow binding China, 
Vietnam and North Korea.  External constraints may be soft and may be hard in 
relationship to the network, exerting growing competitive pressure (hardening) or relaxing 
competitive pressure and conditions of resource acquisition (softening) for the 
reproduction of the network.  
External and internal constraints in self-reproduction:  
We have defined internal constraints of reproduction as structural, while external ones 
as efficiency (or budget) constraints. Structural and efficiency constraints are strongly 
interdependent through the dynamics within and outside the network. Internally, party-
state systems according to the model are very flexible: they translate (form fit) external 
impact to the given distribution of power. This process will prevail until budget constraints 
exerted by the external environment (e.g. loans, FDI, competitive pressures, export 
demand, import conditions) and reproduction constraints defined by internal power 
distribution are soft for the self-reproduction. If structural constraints in self-reproduction 
are met and resources from higher aggregation levels flow poorly, structural constraints 
become hard and exposure to external factors arise and importance of external constraints 
exerted from outside the net emerges. In case resources from outside of the net fall short, 
external impact will exert harder constraints on the self-reproduction of the network. 
The network as a social system: 
The above structural and operational features and their strong interaction with 
external constraints are self-similar in time, in space and in different aggregation levels of 
the structure, and induce self-similar behavior and interest for selection, allocation and 
self-reproduction and involve the same structural and operational traps during 
reproduction.  In such self-similar structures the party as one political entity in one sub-
field, (political), monopolizes its subfield. From the position of political monopoly, the 
party stretches out its instruments of power, and embraces and infiltrates all other sub-
spheres of the society influencing the decision-making process by overlapping positional, 
activity and organizational structures and individual decision-makers. Political rationality 
of infiltration determines the specifics of inequalities in bargaining and reproduction 
capacities and thereby actors’ behavior in time, in space and in different levels of 
aggregation. The evolving politically monopolized institutional power structure that bears 
the above self-similar structural and functional characteristics operates as one specific 
kind of social system that we call party-state systems.   
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However, despite of self-similarities party-states operate, reproduce themselves and 
transform differently.  There is a structural explanation of those differences offered by the 
IPS model.  
Structural background of the variations in the distribution of power:  
Different bargaining positions will provide the distribution of power of the structure. 
Variations in power distribution depend on: (1) the strictness of decisions within the 
hierarchies, (2) the level of centralization or decentralization of discretions over extraction 
and distribution of resources along the state hierarchy, (3) the level of centralization or 
decentralization of the discretion of holding interlinking dependency lines along the party 
hierarchy, its density, its outreach to different fields, sectors, institutions and its depth in 
the place of outreach,  and finally, (4) the level of origin, the level of outreach in the 
hierarchies, the density and the accumulation of short-cuts, be they within and/or across 
state-party hierarchy.  These will together define the differences in the actors’ resisting 
capacity to interventions and their different resource extracting, attracting and allocating 
capacities within the network (see Fig. 5).  
Figure 5. 
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Patterns of power distribution in the network:  
Based on the characteristics of power distribution we may define patterns according to 
(1) the level of centralization or decentralization of interlinking lines on different levels of 
the party hierarchy; (2) the centralization or decentralization of resource extracting and 
allocating capacities along the different levels of the state hierarchy; (3) and the quantity 
and strength of short-cuts providing the extent of resisting capacity and resource attracting 
capacity within the network. Based upon the variations of the above three elements 
(interlinking lines, resources and short-cuts) three such patterns are defined: the self-
exploiting, self-disintegrating and self-withdrawing patterns  
These three patterns will have characteristic distributions of power, characteristic 
instruments for reproducing the power structure and characteristic ways of 
transformation. There is specific a historical “continuity” among the three patterns. 
Originally only the fist, self-exploiting pattern existed in all party-states with variations 
within the same pattern. The other two patterns were formed as a result of the transitory 
collapse of the first pattern in certain party-states where this latter for different reasons 
could not be any more restored. (see Table 1) 
Table 1.  
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Internal (structural) constraints in patterns during self-reproduction:  
Table 1 also demonstrates that self-reproduction of different patterns meet hardening 
structural constraints with different frequency. In other words, frequency of meeting 
structural constraints is pattern-conforming. The order of the three patterns is according 
to increasing resisting capacity within the network and thus, increasing frequency of 
meeting structural constraints. The more decentralized resource extracting and attracting 
capacities and interlinking threads are, and the stronger the feedbacks, the higher the 
resisting capacity of actors within the structure and the sooner the whole structure will 
meet hardening reproduction constraints. The combination of these varieties will at the 
same time, define the scope of the space outside the net. The more frequently the system 
meets reproduction constraints, the higher the need for attracting resources from the fields 
external to the net. 
Theoretically, in self-exploiting pattern there is no field outside the net domestically and 
the net embraces the maximum possible of the extractable resources. Therefore, structural 
constraints in the exploitation of resources will approach natural constraints. Concrete 
natural conditions, economic policy and resources from higher aggregation will define the 
time span of soft reproduction constraints of the whole structure. When natural constraints 
are met and resources from higher aggregation flow narrowly, international factors and 
budget  constraint will play an important role. Adaptation may end up in acquiring new 
resources from outside the net, or restructuring status quo in the net or even transitory of 
definite collapse. 
In the self-disintegrating pattern resource exploitation cannot reach natural 
constraints in consequence of stronger resisting capacity within the pattern. Therefore, 
structural constraints are reached earlier than in self-exploiting pattern. If structural 
constraints are met and resources from higher aggregation flow poorly, reproduction 
constraints within the pattern become hard and exposure to external factors arise and 
importance of soft or hard budget constraints exerted from outside the net emerges.  
In self-withdrawing pattern there is expanded resisting capacity and lower exposure to 
central distribution within the net owing to shortcuts and alternative resource extraction 
capacity within the net at local levels. Consequently, structural constraints are met the 
fastest among the three patterns and also the frequency of hardening reproduction 
constraints is the highest. The choice of relying on external factors becomes the most 
critical in this pattern.  
The hardening of reproduction constraints may attain the whole aggregation and 
induce change. But it may start at lower aggregation levels and may propagate selectively 
across different levels of aggregation and in space at one aggregation level. Selective 
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propagation of hardening reproduction constraints does not necessarily hit the whole 
aggregation in case of economic growth outside the net.  
External constraints and pattern sensitivity in self-reproduction:  
Interdependency of the external and internal dynamics is pattern-dependent. Patterns 
of power distribution reflect the extent of flexibility of internal adaptation to external 
impacts and subsequent adaptation drives. Patterns demonstrate different degrees of 
sensitivity and adaptability to the environment in strong interaction with internal power 
distribution and consequent structural constraint of self-reproduction: the softer the 
reproduction constraint, the more flexible from inside, and the less need for adaptation to 
external impacts.  
Both internal and external conditions may end up in hardening or softening 
reproduction constraints in differing times or simultaneously. Depending on their 
sequence of hardening or softening internally and externally and their respective 
combination of simultaneous or sequential impact, they may work in adverse or parallel 
directions. Different conditions may contribute to different drives of adaptation.2  
Time-span of simultaneous external and internal constraints: 
Simultaneous external and internal constraints may last for short- or long-term.   
Short-term adaptation pressures may conclude in the transitory or definite restructuring 
of the power network during self-reproduction. When hardening reproduction (structural) 
constraints from within and hardening economic constraints exerted from outside the 
network occur simultaneously and for long-term, adaptive drives intensify and 
implementation of pattern-conforming measures accelerate.   
This process in the case of self-exploiting patterns may end up in transitory or definite 
collapse, depending on the reactions of higher level aggregations and external 
circumstances that bring about reversible or irreversible processes from systemic point of 
view. If reversible, they may end up either restoration of the status quo, restoration with 
power restructuring within the same pattern, or restoration with pattern shift. By shifting 
patterns in self-exploiting patterns, structural changes occur both in the direction of 
increased resisting capacities (see Table 1), and/or in the level of decentralization of 
discretion over resource extraction and allocation, and in complexity and the 
“indirectness” of dominant instruments of resource extraction and allocation in the 
                                                        
2 In all patterns size, cultural and historical traditions, geopolitical location and the capacity to 
change status quo in power distribution will influence the extent of the necessity of reliance on 
external sources. 
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decision-making process: from forced resource redeployment, through decentralizing 
(resource revealing) reforms within the net, to market reforms (resource creating) reforms 
outside the network. However, selection criteria and actors’ interest and behavior within 
the net do not radically change as a result of the pattern shift since those are self-similar 
system characteristics in party-states.  
If changes become irreversible in any pattern they will result in system shift.  
  We may speak about system shift instead of pattern shift when so-far dominant 
structural and operating principles, selection criteria and actors adapting behavior become 
irrelevant and different operating principles and selection criteria and according behavior 
become dominant. Therefore, system shift is not a quantitative but a qualitative process. 
System shifts however occur in a process of system transformation with varying speed, and 
under different conditions. 
 The process of system transformation: 
We define system transformation in party-states as the dynamics of a two-sided 
process: on the one hand, we refer to a process of retreat of the party-state network from 
different (economic, social, political) sub-fields of the system (see Figure 6). On the other 
hand, we emphasize the process of emergence and expansion of an alternative field 
(competitive or not) outside the party-state network. Owing to the self-similar and specific 
characteristics of the network, retreat and emergence might begin at different times, occur 
a t  d i f f e r e n t  p a c e ,  o r  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  a t  d i f f e r e nt level of aggregations, or differently in 
geographic space on the same level aggregation, or differently at different social and 
economic sub-fields, or even economic sectors.  
Figure 6.  
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The structural specifics of the process of transformation:  
Transformation process involves the variation of the sequence of transformation of 
different subfields, strongly related to the distribution of power of network in party-states 
(Csanádi, 2006). Both retreat and emergence are pattern-dependent, introducing a path-
dependency in the transformation. Transformation’s structural specifics will be caused by 
the following factors: (1) differences among patterns and on (2) the disparities of power 
distribution  within patterns. (3) Also the interplay among intertwined (similar or 
disparate) patterns of different levels of aggregation matter. Variations arise according to 
the density and depth and extent of centralization or decentralization of intertwining lines 
of dependence, the distribution of power of higher and lower level aggregations. (4) The 
result of the combination of the actual importance of different composing elements of the 
process of retreat and emergence and their interplay will influence the character of 
transformation providing different types of transformation dynamics. (5) Also spatial 
distribution and different clusters of the above four interacting variations will influence the 
propagation and speed of transformation.  
All of the above five characteristics of pattern-conforming path-dependency and their 
spatial distribution will influence where, how and with what sequence, speed, conditions 
and outcome will pattern-dependent transformation occur. Next, we shall detail the above 
structural constraints on the transformation: 
(1) Consequence on the disparities among patterns on the transformation 
The IPS model suggest that path-dependency will emerge due to the different pattern 
dynamics in resulting in (a) the different sequence of transformation of the political and 
economic subfields, (b) in the different pace of the retreat of the net from monopolized 
sub-fields and -- due to different sequence and pace – due to (c) the different political 
conditions of economic transformation and different economic conditions of political 
transformation.(see Fig. 7) 
The interplay of the above structure-conforming characteristics with local individual 
traits will jointly influence the concrete outcome of the process of transformation, the 
adapting capacity of actors during the process, the level of cumulated uncertainties during 
transformation and thereby the speed of transformation at different aggregation levels and 
of different units of one level of aggregation.  
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Figure 7.  
Consequences of structure-conforming transformation  
on sequence speed and conditions 
 
Note: Instruments of Party power: No= Nomenklatura system; Ins= 
Instructor system; To= Subject matter (topic) responsibility; Pl= Party 
lieson system; Pe= connection with the Personnel Department; Co  = 
Regular consultations between enterprise PC secretaries and the branch 
ministry’s secretary; G= Interventions in the name of general responsibility 
of the party 
 
According to the model, retreat and emergence may take place first either in economic 
or political subfield, or even simultaneously, depending on the specifics of the pattern of 
power distribution in the party-state network. The different sequence also influences the 
speed of transformation of the different subfields, the different economic conditions under 
which economic or political transformation is taking place and the different political 
conditions under which economic or political transformation is taking place (Csanádi, 
2006).  The figures 8, 9 and10 below demonstrate the pattern-conforming differences of 
the sequence, speed and conditions of transformation in the case of self-exploiting, self-
disintegrating and self-withdrawing patterns. 
In the case of self-exploiting pattern (e.g. Romania or some post-Soviet states) 
systemic collapse will occur only when growing tensions and increased pressure meet 
expanded internal and external economic and political opportunities or intra-elite conflicts 
arise in consequence of such externalities as the (expected) death of the leader and/or 
collapse of neighboring self-similar systems.  In this pattern the net attached to all sub-
spheres collapses simultaneously and abruptly. Thus, transformation of the different sub-
  20  
fields overlap and political and economic outcome is uncertain while overlapping 
transformations are accompanied by extensive and deep economic crisis due to long-
lasting structural constraints and sudden exposure to competitive conditions causing 
cumulated uncertainties (see Fig. 8).  
Figure 8.   
System transformation in the case of the self-exploiting pattern 
 
In the case of the self-disintegrating pattern (e.g. Hungary) political transformation 
comes first (see later in more detail). In this case, the retreat of the net and the emergence 
of the new political sub-sphere are gradual. In this pattern, political transformation is 
followed by economic transformation. Thus, economic transformation occurs under 
transformed political conditions revealing different levels of institutionalization of 
democratic control. , accompanied by economic crisis due to the gradually evolving 
economic crisis during the politically rational self-reproduction of the system and exposure 
to competitive conditions (see Fig. 9).  
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Figure 9.   
System transformation in the case of the self-disintegrating pattern 
 
In the case of self-withdrawing pattern (e.g. China), economic transformation comes 
first, either followed or not by political transformation (see later in more detail). The 
retreat of the net and the evolution of the new economic sub-sphere is gradual, economic 
transformation occurs under authoritarian political regime, accompanied by 
macroeconomic growth (essentially due to the economic field outside the net) and 
interactions among actors located within the net and those outside the network (see Fig. 
10). 
Figure 10.   
System transformation in the case of the self-withdrawing pattern 
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The retreat of the network in the given sub-sphere may be absolute or relative 
compared to the speed and actual direction of development of the emergent field in a sub-
field. Relative retreat means the faster emergence and expansion of the field outside the 
network compared to the speed of development of the given sub-field embraced by the 
network (be they economic or political). Absolute retreat means the contraction of the 
network while the sphere outside the net is expanding, or stagnating.  
(2)Disparities of power distribution within patterns  
Each pattern provides the main pattern-characteristics of power distribution. 
However, while keeping those characteristics there is a large variety of possible 
distributions of power within the given pattern. Varieties within patterns will influence the 
speed of retreat and emergence, the level of cumulated uncertainty, tensions and turmoil, 
the depth and length of the possible economic and social crisis, the scale of stratification of 
the society and sub-spheres within and outside the net, the size and strength of remaining 
networks, the chances of evolving new ones, the level of corruption, extent of state 
withdrawal and chances of the outcome of the transformation process concerning the new 
political regime and economic transformation. 
In the case of self-exploiting pattern, the more sudden the collapse, longer and deeper 
the economic crisis, the slower the formation of market-friendly institutions and the 
higher is the cumulated uncertainty. The longer the implementation of forced resource 
redeployment, the longer they inhibited the stratification of the society the lower was 
chance for the formation of dissident groups. Thus, the more sudden the collapse, is the 
harder is to adapt to the changing environment and the greater the chance for the 
emergence of abundant  but segregated small horizontal organizations and the harder is to 
form coalition among them be they economic, political or civil initiatives. In such cases 
chances grow for authoritarian domination of economic and political transformation or 
that of its stagnation. It is also greater the chance that the new regime will benefit from the 
fragmented infrastructure of the collapsed party-state power. It is also greater the chance 
for the state to be captured by the political leadership, cliques and fragments of former 
networks.  
In the case of self-disintegrating pattern: The less flexible was the structure from inside 
owing to resisting capacities, the more intensive the drive to adapt to external 
constraints.3 However pattern-conforming adaptation to restore party legitimacy takes 
                                                        
3 Here is the mistake many comparative reformers have committed when suggesting the ideal 
origin, speed, sequence, and ideal regime of reforms without structural context. (Csanádi, 2006) 
Taking strategy superior over  structural specifics this will blur structurally defined sequence, 
speed, and political conditions of economic transformation and  political conditions of economic 
transformation.    
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place with the escalation of decentralizing reforms and due to their inefficiency, the 
gradual loss of party legitimacy and the subsequent retreat of the network from the 
political sub-sphere.  Meanwhile, decentralizing reforms  bring about more stratified 
economic entities and activities, and social stratification. The longer (the more gradual) is 
the transformation of the political subfield the more complex becomes the economic and 
political stratification of the society, and the higher is the chance for the emergence of 
horizontal political entities within the disintegrating political network and in the spheres 
abandoned by the retreating network by dissidents to form coalition that may develop into 
parties. Reforms, social stratification and horizontal organizations increase the chances for 
the stabilization of a democratic political regime; make it easier for the society to adapt to 
changes; and increases the chances for shorter period of economic crisis and that of 
cumulated uncertainty.4 
In the case of the self-withdrawing pattern under authoritarian political regime, the 
more gradual is the retreat of the network from the economic sub-sphere, the larger the 
scope of emerging new economic sub-field outside the network, the more complex the 
economic stratification of the society becomes and the higher the tensions due to 
disparities of income and economic development channels to voice tensions remain weak. 
The more constrained the emergence of institutions for voicing (be they social, economic 
or political) outside the net during economic transformation, the larger the pressure on the 
party and the state to maintain political stability and growth. 
Variations in the transformation not only depend on the differences among patterns 
and within those, but also may vary according to the different weight of their composing 
factors. 
(3)Composing elements of the process of retreat and emergence 
The major factors of retreat either in economic or political subfields to be detailed 
below are the following: decentralizing, emptying, withdrawing, weakening and cutting off 
t h e  n e t .  I n  e m e r g i n g  f i e l d s  i n  c a s e  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  o r  c a p i t a l i s t  o r d e r :  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
horizontal organizations and institutions, expansion of the field by those competitive 
activities, capital and organizations transferred from the net as a result of its emptying and 
cut-off.  The different combination of the inherent factors of the transformation of a 
subfield will interact and thus reinforce or slow down mutual dynamics.  Emerging new 
field does not necessarily show democratic or capitalist characteristics. The outcome of 
                                                        
4 Until democratic institutions do not stabilize there are chances for new power holders to neglect or 
minimize their capacity for checks and balances and become authoritarian as it occurred in several 
post-communist countries in Europe and disintegrated nation-level aggregations of the former 
Soviet Union. 
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transformations may result in various political and economic orders: sultanism, or other 
authoritarian political regime and uncertain economic system ranging from feudalism to 
capitalism. (Bunce, Wolchik, 2006). We shall illustrate the emergence of these elements 
and their sequence in the different patterns.  
In self-exploiting patterns, where system collapse is abrupt and transformation of 
subfields is cumulated, it is extremely hard to separate the impact of individual ingredient 
factors of retreat and those of emergence. The sequence and weight of the factors of retreat 
and emergence is hardly discernible, so is the mutual impact of retreating or emerging 
factors with different speed. It is accidental whether, when and which will gain weight or 
become dominant and whether the impact of the combination of those factors in the given 
conditions will actually lead to the reinforcement or the slowdown of transformation. It is 
also accidental how many times will these swings occur and what will be the final outcome 
(see the frequent political swings in Romania Albania, and the former Soviet states). 
Outcome is further blurred due to high level of cumulated uncertainties, deep and long-
stretching economic recession, lack of alternative crystallized political force, lack of clear 
constituencies etc (see Fig. 11).  
Figure 11.  
Parallel and cumulated transformation (retreat and emergence) of the 
different subfields 
 
Note: Blue arrows represent the factors of the emerging alternative field 
(forming economic and political institutions outside the network) while red 
ones the factors of the retreating network (e.g. weakening, withdrawing, 
emptying, cut off) 
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We take the example of Hungary in self-disintegrating patterns, where due to 
hardening reproduction constraints of the system and consequently declining capacity for 
resource distribution, interactivity through the network declined. This drove economic 
policy and party to get rid of burdens by decentralizing the discretion over interlinking 
lines that reach the economic decision-makers. Declining influence and legitimacy of the 
party enhanced the cut-off of the network by growing numbers of quitting party members. 
Cadres emptied party positions by shifting carrier to public or private spheres (empty). 
Party withdrew interlinking line by abolishing full-time position of party secretaries 
subordinating them to enterprise managers. The shortened (withdrew) intra-hierarchical 
and interlinking lines by organizing multi-candidate elections: at local level governments. 
Weakened its influence by decentralizing former central discretion of ministries to appoint 
enterprise managers to local committees within enterprises, where local party apparatus 
had only selection function from self-candidates. Multi-candidacy was also introduced in 
the case of nominees to the parliament and to the central committee membership 
(weakening). Rationalization drives bring about the decrease of interest promotion 
possibilities through shortcuts. Actions were implemented to decrease short-cuts, thereby 
decreasing pressures towards resource distribution: the number of members in inter-
ministerial and intraparty working committees was steered, or the whole committee was 
abolished, or large enterprises with shortcuts were disaggregated thereby cutting off their 
feedbacks and chances to create new ones in the name of competitiveness.  
Disintegration of the party as a monopolized political power advanced: Exposed to 
external and internal pressures, power struggle within the party sharpened and party 
members begun to form horizontal platforms within the party forums, expressing and 
formalizing different political -- conservative, liberal, reformist – views. Also reform 
groups were organized horizontally within the network crossing vertical lines of the 
hierarchy and also interlinking lines among hierarchies between party and non-party 
institutions. Holders, targets and functions of dependency threads were abolished 
(withdrawal): party secretary within non-party institutions ceased to be paid positions, so 
did party secretary position at district and county committees. Decentralized and 
weakened and steered nomenklatura system was abolished, and except for party discipline 
and party cells of members working in non-party organizations, other party functions 
remained social work without influence in both economic and administrative subfields.  
Later, political pressure from outside the net ousted from and forbid Party organizations in 
non-party institutions. Remaining party membership became organized on regional basis. 
Party soon declared the withdrawal from the requirement of party hegemony. Party 
apparatus (the holder of interlinking lines) was abolished, cadres scattered throughout 
economic and administrative fields. Workers’ militia, the party’s own military organization 
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was also abolished. Party collapsed and split into several parties according to former 
platforms. As a result of the process of retreat, Party as a social system was withdrawn 
from political and economic subfields, abolished as a hegemonic party and reborn as a 
political entity in a de-monopolized political sub-field (see Fig. 12).  
Figure 12.  
The factors of retreat in self-disintegrating system 
 
Parallel to the gradual retreat, a new political sub-field was emerging outside the net. 
Growing number of horizontal groups outside the net was allowed to form: first NGOs of 
various kinds emerge with non-political scope. Formation of various interest groups was 
allowed to organize both on economic, public and political subfields. Formation of various 
political parties was allowed and later multiparty system institutionalized. With the 
withdrawal of the net, horizontal reform groups and platforms within the congress formed 
different leftist parties. Former party members leaving the net joined the new formations. 
Large extra-parliamentary coalition of the forming opposition was accepted as political 
partner by the Party (oppositional roundtable) and assumed decision-making functions. 
Based on its decisions and political pressure from outside the net, crucial laws were 
accepted by the old parliament. Such laws were: the institutionalization of free elections, 
publicity law, rule of law, strike law etc setting the basis of a democratic political regime. 
The new parliament was formed based on free elections. The reformist wing of the former 
communist party entered the new parliament as a small opposition party (Figure 13). 
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Figure13.  
The factors of emergence in self-disintegrating pattern 
 
In the case of the self-withdrawing pattern the retreat starts due to long-term 
structural (internal) constraint of self-reproduction, and thus, to frequent hardening of 
reproduction constraint of the network. This is what forces decision-makers to leap out of 
the net. This process occurred either by opening up to external world and/or increasing 
the field outside the net domestically. The aim was the acquisition of further resources to 
maintain the reproduction of the network however this process also expanded gradually 
and long-term the competitive pressure on the economic subfield covered by the network.  
In theoretical terms it commenced by decentralization (see Fig. 14) of the dependency lines 
in the economy, followed by the withdrawal, and the cut-off of the lines of the net or the 
emptying and weakening the network. In practice in the Chinese case, it meant the 
decentralization of burdening decisions over allocations without decentralizing resources,  
Decentralization of loss-making economic units, and inversely, sucking up new resources 
and profit-making economic units. Lower level administration to where burdening 
distributional functions and inefficient economic units were decentralized began to close-
down or privatize inefficient state-owned and collective enterprises (cutting off 
hierarchical and interlinking lines). The rationalization of management that brought about 
the abolishment of the institutional background of compulsory planning, and later on the 
abolishment of resource distribution discretions, and approval of smaller value investment 
goals at lower level were abolished (withdrawal). With the expansion and pressure of the 
competitive field from outside the net the stripping of state values through the transfer of 
competitive capital, product, organization and manpower accelerated (emptying the net). 
Also an opposite process took place: the infiltration of alternative (private) capital, 
behavior and interest (capitalist) and organizations into the net for political economic and 
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distributional advantages. In such economic formations (joint ventures) the party’s 
influence in decision-making substantially decreased (weakening).  
Figure 14. 
 The factors of the retreat of the network 
 
The emerging and expanding field outside the party-state context also occurred in 
different dimensions. It meant increasing decentralization of decision-making over 
production factors both in agriculture and industry that provided larger room for 
maneuver for economic units. The development and expansion of the emergent market  in 
China was also fuelled by the dual-track price system, the growing number and scope of 
joint ventures with foreign capital, the green-field foreign and domestic private and 
privatized enterprises, as well as the transferred values (capital, organization, activity and 
manpower) from the party-state sphere and the developing market-friendly institutional 
background. (see Fig. 15). 
The composing factors of the process of retreat and emergence may become important 
in different sequences, individually, simultaneously, or in different combinations. Their 
different combination will influence the ways the transformation occurs within each 
pattern. Major composing factors of the process are similar (see tables 12 and 14; and 
Tables 13 and 15), no matter the sequence of transformation neither the subfield under 
transformation.  Similar factors raise similar problems and incite similar solutions despite 
economic and social disparities (Csanádi, 2005, 2006, 2007). This characteristic is 
common, also independent of the space and level of aggregation and the sequence of 
transformation of sub-fields. However, the scale of impact will be strongly influenced by 
the sequence, speed and conditions of system transformation and the distribution of power 
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within the pattern and the combination of the variety of its factors and individual 
characteristics.  
Figure 15.  
The factors of the emerging competitive field 
 
 (4) The impact of different levels of aggregation on the transformation 
The fourth systemic factor that influences the speed of transformation and the 
outcome of the transformation is the mutual impact of the relationship between and within 
pattern differences among different levels of aggregation. The different administrative 
levels may be closely or loosely intertwined within a self-similar unit owing to the density 
and depth of dependency threads and feedbacks of the unit, the supra-unit and its sub-
units, institutions and individuals within them, providing the self-similar unit’s complex 
constraints of self-reproduction. 
The different interplay of the distribution of power at different level aggregations and 
the density of their inter-linkage will contribute to the systemic constraints of the 
development of individual characteristics of economic and social disparities in time and in 
space and thus the characteristics of the emerging new social systems.  The mutual impact 
among levels of aggregation will result in the constraints and opportunities for 
disaggregation of aggregated self-similar units and influence outcomes. Disaggregation of 
party-states (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) are attributed to the crucial 
role of the spatial concentration of nationalities providing the drive for detachment 
(Bunce, 1999). However, spatially concentrated minority and power structure interplay 
with many factors and will produce a wide variety of possible outcomes. Outcomes may 
depend on whether higher and lower level aggregations and same level aggregations are of 
different patterns, or varieties within patterns. Historical experiences suggest that there is 
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m o r e  c h a n c e  f o r  d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  i n  c a s e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  o n  h i g h e r  a n d  s a m e  l e v e l  
aggregations. Chances increase and drives grow if national level minority forms local level 
majority, and whether these latter are integrated or not in the local network or higher 
levels and across hierarchies, or there is a neighboring local level integrated majority of 
country level same minority. The more integrated into the network the higher the chance 
for resisting capacity and thus disaggregation. Crucial is the role of power distribution 
among aggregation levels: to what extent discretions over interlinking lines, extraction and 
allocation have been decentralized. The more decentralized the higher is the chance for 
disaggregation. Opposite is the impact of the density and depth of interlinking lines 
handled at the higher aggregation level attaining lower levels. The denser they are and the 
lower they reach the less the chance for disaggregation. The combination of these factors 
w i l l  h a v e  a n  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  a n d  d r i v e s  a n d  o u t c o m e s  o f  t o t a l  o r  p a r t i a l  
disaggregation of larger aggregations and on their speed of disaggregation during 
transformation.5 
External constraints and pattern sensitivity in transformation:  
The more flexible was the structure from inside (the less capacity for resistance to 
interventions), the less necessity for adaptation to the environment, thus the more abrupt 
the collapse and the slower the retreat of fragmented networks and the development of the 
emergent field. The less flexible was the structure from inside, the more drive to adapt to 
external constraints, the more gradual the retreat and the faster is the emergence of the 
new sub-spheres.6 Consequently, varieties within patterns will influence the speed of 
retreat and emergence, the level of cumulated uncertainty, tensions and turmoil, the level 
of corruption, the depth and length of the possible economic and social crisis. Varieties will 
also have an impact on the scale of stratification of the society and sub-spheres within and 
outside the net. They will affect the degree of remaining networks, the chances of evolving 
new ones, and degree of state withdrawal and chances of the outcome of the 
transformation process concerning the new political regime and economic transformation. 
                                                        
5 Further questions emerge which are out of the scope of thise study. What if local majorities and 
self-similar networks but different patterns do not overlap? And what if they overlap? Is there 
non-disaggregated country with local majorities different patterns? What if local majorities, self-
similar networks but variations within patterns overlap? What if minority is also locally such? 
What if the local majority is the same as country level majority but it has different patters within 
self-similar network? 
 
6 Here is the mistake many comparative reformers have committed when suggesting the ideal 
origin, speed, sequence, and ideal regime of reforms neglecting the structural context (Csanádi, 
2006). Taking strategy superior over structural specifics this will blur structurally defined 
sequence, speed, and political conditions of economic transformation and economicl conditions of 
political transformation.    
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Thus, self-withdrawing pattern will be structurally the most exposed and thus, the most 
adaptive, while self-exploiting (all party-states in the 1950ies or Romania by the end of the 
1980s or North Korea to the present) the less adaptive to external impacts.  
The time-span of constraints exerted on transformation:  
Hardening or softening constraints that incite different adaptation pressures may last 
for short- and long-term -- also during transformation. These pressures will spur different 
adapting behavior according to transforming patterns and actual external dynamics. On 
the one hand, short-term adaptation pressures might provoke transitory or definite 
restructurings of the net and the slow-down of the process of transformation. On the other 
hand, long-term adaptation pressures during transformation might bring about the 
acceleration of the transformation of the whole system enhancing the conditions of the 
transformation of further sub-fields.  Characteristics of this speed-up will be pattern-
dependent.  
Dynamics of transformation: 
Concluding the above, (1)  the differences among patterns (2)  the different distribution 
of power within patterns, (3) the different combination of the factors of retreat and 
emergence in transforming sub-fields (4) the differences of power distribution and the 
interconnectedness of different aggregation levels are the systemic structural constraints 
of the development of economic and social disparities also influences by spatial disparities 
at same aggregation levels. External and internal constraints and their interrelated 
dynamics may contribute to the speed-up or slow-down of the process. Disparities in time 
and in space will contribute to the individual varieties of political or economic 
transformation both at local levels and on different levels of aggregation and on different 
sub-fields. Spatial disparities in the dynamics of system transformation may stabilize or 
cause unprecedented frictions among neighboring units that may speed up or slow down 
the transformation process, may propagate or may remain insulated. These constraints 
together will contribute to the characteristics and relative speed of the transformation.  
Therefore, though we still argue that system transformation means the retreat of the 
network from different subfields and the emergence of a new system outside the network, 
transformation does not imply a continuous process of “transition”, neither outcome is 
guaranteed to be democratic or capitalist. Transformation process has a dynamics in which 
the direction and speed of change of the network relative to those in the dynamics of the 
emergent field may vary according to the combination of the above external and internal 
factors.  
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In this respect, the IPS model combines theoretical and empirical research purposes. 
Despite being a theoretical framework for comparative analysis of party states and their 
transformation, operationalized composing factors of retreat and emergence also serve as 
instruments to measure the dynamics of transformation through the relative speed and 
direction of retreat and emergence.  
Table 2 depicts the possible variations of directions of change of the network and 
emergent fields relative to each other. One can see that there are nine variations of parallel 
change that become multiplied if we take into consideration also the relative speed in the 
process of change of the two fields. Relative direction and speed of change of the two fields 
will be called as the dynamics of transformation. 
Table 2.  
 Different types of transformation dynamics 
 
Definition of the dynamics of transformation allows for measuring the different 
variations in time and space and aggregation levels using the composing factors or retreat 
and emergence (e.g. privatization, close-down of economic units within the net, creation of 
competitive units outside of it, development of different indicators of economic units 
within and outside the net etc).  
The above mentioned factors are the systemic characteristics of transformation. Their 
interaction with the size, economic, social, cultural, historical, geopolitical conditions of 
the given unit (be it at any level aggregation), and the actual individual external and 
internal dynamics will mutually influence each other and determine the varieties of system 
transformation and their outcome. Among the different dynamics dominant dynamics may 
shift in different periods in space and different aggregation levels. Shifts may be of longer 
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or shorter term representing the time-span of slow-down or acceleration of transformation 
and its dynamics respectively.7 
The IPS model’s characteristics as a methodological framework for interpreting  system 
evolution8: 
Based on the above influencing factors of transformation we can raise the following 
question: Is the transformation of party-state systems an evolutionary process? Literature 
on social evolution does not provide standard criteria or concepts to which one could 
confront the characteristics found in the structure, operation and transformation of party-
state systems described by the IPS model. Practically, there is no explicit definition of 
social evolution from system point of view (Kornai, 2000b). Debate is still evolving on 
several dimensions. Views are scattered and results of the efforts to integrate them into a 
complex paradigm is still in the waiting. Problems emerge in combining institutions and 
individuals, institutions and systems, social systems and individuals, dominant selection 
criteria within the system, voluntary individual and involuntary systemic selection, 
individual strategies and systemic criteria of operation, internal and external selection 
criteria, system transformation with system shift, transformation and varieties of systemic 
outcomes, combining modernization, development, transformation and evolution, 
adapting all this from the point of view of competing theories of natural, cultural, 
economic selection (Schelkle et al. 2000).  
Below we shall point to the characteristics of the IPS model from the point of view of 
the above emerging problems in evolutionary theory regarding to social systems.  
The analysis of institutional structure of party-states in the model not only embraces 
formal bureaucratic rules, procedures, outcomes of a hierarchical structure, but also  the 
                                                        
7 Based on empirical analysis in China during 1999 and 2008 of the changes in the gross industrial 
output value of the economic units belonging to the net and those belonging to the emergent field 
we can experience one dominant transformation dynamics: that of the absolute retreat during the 
whole period. This type of dynamics refers to the expansion of the emergent field parallel to the 
contraction of the network field. It fits to the theoretical concept of the transformation in the model. 
We can also detect shifts of dominant dynamics in two periods within the longer interval: one was 
statistically confirmed when external constraints softened by China entering the WTO in 2001. This 
move had spill-over effects to the network field, changing the dynamics from absolute to relative 
retreat of the net, that is, when both fields grow, but that of the net is slower. This type of 
transformation dynamics slows down the speed of transformation. The other shift though lacking 
contemporary statistical data was detected through newspaper analysis, when  external constraints 
hardened  due to declined export chances in global crisis. Decreased export chances contracted the 
emergent field, while the network field expanded due to increased state interventions The shift, 
though transitory, also implied a slow-down in the dynamics of transformation  (Csanádi, 2010a,b) 
8 This part of the theoretical chapter should be taken as a sketch, since it needs further thorough 
work. Social system change based on network analysis mentioned above should be analyzed in the 
context of evolutionary literature dealing with social change and social paradigms.(e.g. by Kornai in 
2008a,b, 2009 (first presented in 1998, Berlin); Schelkle at al. ed., 2000; Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson 
and Knutsen, 2006; Carothers, 2002; Hermann Pillath, 2008; North, 2006). 
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institutional ties binding party, state and economic actors across hierarchies are taken into 
account. The IPS model reveals the interrelation of the political, bureaucratic and 
economic fields through individual interactions of decision-makers in party-state systems. 
Thus, the IPS model simultaneously involves individual actors and institutions, and 
provides both the structural basis and the dynamic consequences of their interactions.   
The IPS model interprets structural position of an actor nested in the network in party-
state systems as simultaneously holder of, and captured by, dependency threads and 
interest promotion channels. Hence the complex capacity of actors for resource attraction 
from above, resisting capacity to interventions, resource extraction from below and 
allocation capacity. Inequalities of these capacities depend on actors’ different extent of 
bargaining capacities based on politically rational concerns in the power structure. These 
same structural conditions will modify the interpretation of budget constraints in party-
states (Kornai, 1992): budget constraints, if nested in power relations, will be interpreted 
as the reproduction constraints of bargaining capacities, while soft budget constraints 
attributed to economic units in general in party-states will be regarded as selectively soft 
or hard reproduction constraints of different actors within the network according to their 
bargaining capacities. 
Constraints of reproduction of individual bargaining capacities are strongly tied to the 
reproduction constraints of the whole structure. Interrelation evolves through the 
distribution of power in the network and related individual bargaining capacities within it 
for resource extraction, resource attraction, resource distribution and resisting to 
interventions. The higher the individual actors’ bargaining capacities within the structure, 
the more frequently the reproduction of the whole structure meets hardening constraints, 
owing to hardships of resource extraction due to resistance, and to path dependent 
distribution based on political rationality.  
The IPS model deals with disparities of power distribution and its consequences both 
in time, in space and different levels of aggregation through the network. Thus, it is able to 
handle simultaneously the dichotomist dynamic concepts of center-periphery, principal-
agent, state-society, party-state, economy-politics, central authoritarianism-local 
federalism and central planning and local government as different aspects of the same 
power relations that form the network.  
The same network characteristics allow us to combine self-reproduction with the self-
similar reasons of encoded self-consumption of the system, despite the differences in 
pattern of power distribution, instruments of resource extraction and distribution and 
economic conditions. Since economic behavior is politically rational instead of 
economically, and power distribution rather than efficiency determines the constraints of 
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self-reproduction of the system, the process of self-reproduction is simultaneously a 
process of self-consumption.  
Similar complexity is characteristic in handling the system’s self-reproduction and 
transformation in its strong interdependence. Transformation is usually taken as 
transition to market economy without reflecting on the impact of the interrelated 
development process of the retreating network and the emerging field outside of it. The 
model reflects the strong interrelation among self-reproduction, retreat and emergence by 
linking the frequency of hardening constraints of self-reproduction owing to the specifics 
of power distribution to the dominant instruments of self-reproduction (forced resource 
extraction and redistribution, resource revealing, decentralizing reforms within the 
network and resource creating reforms outside the network). In this respect the model is 
able to deal simultaneously with decentralization of decisions, reforms and the lack of 
reforms by integrating them and their complex function according to power relations, and 
within those, in the different patterns of self-reproduction.  
The model, finds interrelation between structural patterns of power distribution their 
dynamics and the differences in the sequence, speed and condition of transformation. It 
also points to the similarities of the composing elements within the processes of retreat 
(decentralization, emptying, withdrawing, weakening and cutting off of the network) and 
those in the processes of emergence (the transfer of units and individuals cut-off the net, 
and that of activities, organizations, groups, individuals and capital stripped off the net, 
development of that of horizontal relationships and new horizontal organizations), no 
matter which sub-field is surveyed and which patterns are examined.  
The model thereby is able to distinguish reforms, marketization and system 
transformation frequently taken as synonyms in comparative literature. Reforms in the 
model are instruments of self-reproduction of the party-state system, be they within or 
outside the network; marketization is one  usual variant of the emergent field outside the 
network during the process of the transformation (retreat and emergence) of the economic 
sub-field; while transformation is a process of system change either with or without 
reforms, sudden, or gradual, in different sequence (economic or political transformation 
first) and different political and economic conditions, with different possible outcomes 
owing to different patterns of power distribution and different dominant pattern-
conforming instruments of self-reproduction. Opposite to the usual comparative approach, 
the model interprets elite behavior, strategy implementation within the framework of 
structural constraints and path dependencies but also considering their mutual impact.  
Thus, the model handles reforms from below, above, within authoritarian rule or in 
democracy a structurally determined condition rather than an ideal elite’s ideal strategic 
choice.  
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The model takes external economic constraints (exerted by the field outside the net, 
either domestically or abroad), and internal structural constraints (depending on internal 
power distribution) simultaneously into consideration in their mutual dynamic impact on 
the system’s self-reproduction. The strong interrelation and mutual impact of external and 
internal elements of reproduction constraints is revealed through their alternating or 
simultaneous softness or hardness exerting varying strength of adaptation pressures; 
pressures are combined with the varying time-span of their impact; also pattern 
dependence of impacts and reactions to varying external and internal adaptation pressures 
in time, in space and in different aggregation levels are considered. All these impacts may 
occur in different stages of the reproduction dynamics: both during the period of self-
reproduction and during transformation with different consequences. These same external 
and internal constraints combined with different time-span explain the differences to the 
reactions to adaptation pressures of the same patterns and that of different patterns.  
Based on the self-similarities in time, space and levels of aggregation, the model 
handles disparities of operation and transformation also spatially and simultaneously in 
different levels of aggregation.  
Interpretation of social system evolution of party-states with the instruments of the IPS 
model: 
We suggest that the above characteristics of the IPS model might contribute for a 
methodological framework for interpreting social system evolution.  Based on this 
dynamic network we can define the meaning of evolution in party-state systems: evolution 
of party-state systems may mean pattern change or system change that occurs during the 
drives for the system’s self-reproduction. Thus, system evolution in party-states includes 
the self-reinforcing interactions between self-reproduction, retreat of the network and 
emergence of a new system during internal and external drives for adaptation.  
Incentive for individual adaptation drives, and content of adaptation are fuelled by the 
system’s specific selection mechanism inciting politically rational economic behavior to 
reproduce or improve bargaining capacities within the network and fit selection criteria. 
From the point of view of the adaptation of the net: the occurrence of pattern conforming 
rare, occasional or frequent hardening of structural constraints incite pattern-conforming 
adaptation pressures in strong interaction with  the externally exerted softening or 
hardening competitive adaptation pressures. Depending on the time-span of internal 
structural and external competitive pressures, adaptation may end up in restructuring 
status-quo in the net, in temporary or definite collapse; temporary collapse means either 
reversibility, since it may end up in restoring original complexity status-quo in the net. It 
may however be irreversible, improving the complexity of the structure by forming new 
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patterns; Though in principle cannot  be excluded, historically only self-exploiting patterns 
were intersected by temporary collapse, thus, reorganization in new patterns occurred only 
from the original self-exploiting pattern. New patterns are more complex than the original 
one,  regarding instruments of self-reproduction and actors behavior and adaptation.   
However, shift of patterns after transitory collapse is not unavoidable: original pattern 
may be regenerated, and thus, complexity not increased. In case of pattern shift, structural 
changes occur both in the direction of increased resisting capacities, and/or towards the 
decentralization of discretions over resource extraction and allocation, and towards the 
dominance of indirect instruments of resource extraction and allocation, and more room 
for maneuver for decision-makers during self-reproduction.  However drives for 
adaptation and fitting selection criteria, as well as this latter within the net remain 
unchanged. 
Irreversible collapse may be abrupt in less complex, gradual in more complex patterns.  
In case of longer-term parallel external and internal hardening of structural and 
competitive (internal and external) constraints on different patterns complexity is not 
decreased, neither new pattern-shifts occur but in all patterns adaptation takes place with 
the escalation of the frequency of the implementation of dominantly pattern-conforming 
measures leading to system transformation. Thus, despite growing complexity with pattern 
shift, this latter is not a precondition of transformation and system change. Pattern shifts 
may be interpreted as system evolution due to growing complexity, but transformation and 
system change may occur without pattern shift as well.  
In all patterns system change is pre-empted by a process of system transformation 
when the network as a social system is withdrawing and parallel to this process outside of 
on vestiges or the retreating network a new system is emerging. Depending on pattern 
characteristics, the sequence of this process regarding sub-spheres of the system is (a) 
either cumulative as all sub-spheres of the system collapse and transform simultaneously, 
or sequential (b) since retreat and emergence (transformation) occurs dominantly first in 
economic or first political sub-spheres. Sequence will define the political and economic 
conditions under which simultaneous or sequential transformations occur. No matter the 
speed, sequence and conditions of transformation, all may end up in system shift. 
Shifting social systems during the process of self-reproduction mean the gradual or 
sudden retreat of the main composing elements of the network. Retreat also implies the 
vanishing of the dominant organizing principle, within that the main principles of 
connection and operation, institutions of coordination and control and subsequent 
selection criteria and actors’ interest and behavior. During the retreat of the network the 
composing elements of a new system emerge with different selection criteria and different 
institutions of coordination and control inducing different interests and behavior. In case 
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structural changes do not attain the main elements and connecting and operating 
principles of the system, then these changes are reversible, and thus, do not mean 
evolution, only self-reproduction of the status quo. If they do reach system characteristics, 
than changes may become irreversible (if not restored by the higher level aggregation), 
status quo cannot be restored and the process of evolution leads to system change.   
Outcome only retrospectively looks like a transition when all failed alternatives that 
emerged during the transformation lost importance. Dynamics of transformation and 
outcomes are evolutionary processes structurally influenced by the interplay of several 
structural characteristics of the network: the differences among patterns, the differences 
within patterns, the differences and density of ties between different level aggregations of 
the network, the interplay and different weight of the composing factors of the process of 
retreat and that of emergence and the consequences of their interaction during the 
process, as well as  the characteristics of its spatial propagation, all these interacting with 
the dynamics and varying pressures of the external environment.  Owing to these impacts, 
dynamics of transformation is full of unprecedented swings of different amplitude, speed-
ups and slow-downs, repeated shifts in the type of transformation dynamics characterized 
by the differences in relative direction and speed of change of retreat and emergence 
Dynamics of transformation may produce reversible quantitative changes without 
qualitative shifts or may freeze in the longer-term stabilization of any hybrid system form. 
All the above structural and dynamic factors interacting with individual characteristics 
(size, cultural, historical traditions, level of development, geopolitical location, elite quality 
and position, minorities’ integration into the network etc) and changing external 
conditions of the given field will have a strong impact on the emergent institutions, 
interests and behavior, economic and social stratifications, the level of cumulated 
uncertainty, the duration of the economic crisis and the type of new political and economic 
order and its instability. Owing to the self-similar characteristics of party-states in time, 
space and different levels of aggregation, system evolution may be traced at any self-
similar unit at any level and any sub-field, or any sector reached by the network. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Let us summarize the specifics of the IPS model concerning operation and transformation 
of party-state systems. The model is a comparative institutional framework that defines 
the main elements, main connecting and operating principles of party-states. Elements 
and principles are structural and functional components of a network formed in the 
decision-making process through the dependency and interest promotion relationship of 
party- state- and economic decision-makers during interaction. Elements, connecting and 
operating principles are self-similar in time, in space and at different levels of aggregation 
of the network. The model also describes the structural background of the varieties of 
different operations and transformations in time in space and in different aggregation 
levels despite self-similarities. It reveals the main structural factors influencing the 
varieties in the operation, transformation and outcomes in the system transformation.  
The above structural and operational features and their strong interaction with 
external constraints that are self-similar in time, in space and in different aggregation 
levels of the structure, will induce self-similar behavior and interest for selection, 
allocation and self-reproduction and involve the same structural and operational traps 
during reproduction.  In such self-similar structures the party as one political entity in one 
sub-field, (political), monopolizes its subfield. From the position of political monopoly, the 
party stretches out its instruments of power, and embraces and infiltrates all other sub-
spheres of the society influencing the decision-making process by overlapping positional, 
activity and organizational structures and individual decision-makers. Political rationality 
of infiltration determines the specifics of inequalities in bargaining and reproduction 
capacities and thereby actors’ behavior in time, in space and in different levels of 
aggregation. The evolving politically monopolized institutional power structure that bears 
the above self-similar structural and functional characteristics operates as one specific 
kind of social system that we call party-state systems.   
By interpreting the structure, operation and transformation of a system as a network 
and its dynamics, several apparently independent dimensions of the social system may be 
analyzed in their complexity and interdependence and as factors of a social system 
evolution. The network is able to bind individual actors and institutions, individual and 
systemic self-reproduction; self-reproduction and instruments of self-reproduction. It 
involves the convivance of different instruments of self-reproduction and combines 
patterns and dominant instruments of self-reproduction. The model interlinks structure, 
operation, transformation and varieties of systemic outcomes. It distinguishes the specifics 
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of internal and external selection. It also defines structural adaptation mechanisms and 
motivations within the network for selection and better fitting, and adaptation 
mechanisms to external pressures and their pattern dependence. Through the 
characteristics of systemic self-similarities in the network, chances emerge for the 
evaluation of different aggregation level units. The model also clarifies the interrelation of 
strategies and systemic mechanisms; the differences between reforms and 
transformations, transformation and system change; pattern shifts, system shifts and the 
dynamics of complexity in those.  
The system characteristics and dynamics suggested by the model in main principles of 
coordination selection, adaptation and changing complexity in pattern and system change 
and uncertainties and structural constraints in path dependency and outcome allow for 
interpreting this process of self-reproduction and transformation as a social system 
evolution.   
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